No Surrender to the Taliban!’ Football Hooliganism, Islamophobia and the Rise of the English Defence League by Garland, J & Treadwell, J
‘NO SURRENDER TO THE TALIBAN’: FOOTBALL HOOLIGANISM, ISLAMOPHOBIA 
AND THE RISE OF THE ENGLISH DEFENCE LEAGUE 
 
 
JON GARLAND AND JAMES TREADWELL 
 
 
Abstract 
On a number of occasions throughout 2009 and 2010 violent clashes occurred between white and 
Asian males, anti-fascist demonstrators and the police in city centres in the United Kingdom. These 
disturbances involved a new organisation, the English Defence League (EDL), which claims to 
oppose ‘radical Islam’. This article charts the growth of the EDL and the affiliated Casuals United, 
and examines their motivations and ideologies. It assesses their links with football hooligan ‘firms’, 
and whether these links mean that the EDL has a large pool of violent ‘footsoldiers’ at its disposal, 
and concludes that the EDL’s Islamophobic views and provocative street army tactics mean that it 
poses the most serious threat to public order and community cohesion since the heyday of the 
National Front in the 1970s.  
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Introduction 
The summer and autumn of 2009 witnessed growing concern in the United Kingdom over a number 
of disturbances in city centres involving a range of new, seemingly ‘far-right’ activist groups. 
Positioning themselves in vocal opposition to ‘radical Islam’ and ‘Islamic extremism’, these groups 
organised a series of protest marches in the latter half of that year that on several occasions erupted 
into violent clashes between the protesters, counter-demonstrators and the police. 
  
Incorporated amongst the marchers were several related factions, including Casuals United, the 
English Defence League (EDL), Welsh Defence League, Scottish Defence League, March for 
England, United British Alliance, British Citizens Against Islam Extremists and Stop the 
Islamification of Europe (Gable, Cressy and Woodson, 2009). The most prominent of these were 
Casuals United and the EDL, two overlapping and inter-linking groups that have emerged out of the 
fringes of England’s domestic football hooligan subculture that has long been associated by 
commentators (although only occasionally accurately, see Armstrong, 1999; Stott and Pearson, 2007) 
with the politics of the extreme right. Utilising twenty-first century methods of networking, and 
functioning in a world where domestic banning ordersi and prohibitive ticket pricing make football a 
less attractive arena in which to seek physical confrontation, these two groups have been portrayed in 
the press as twenty-first century harbingers of far-right extremist politics (see, for example, Kerbaj 
2009).  
In this article we offer a preliminary examination of the origins and development of the EDL and 
Casuals United, and suggest that the emergence of concern at ‘extremist Islam’ is a new form of the 
traditional coupling of reactionary politics and football hooligan/casual culture. Through an analysis 
of media coverage, EDL and Casuals United websites and material, YouTube videos and Internet 
networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter, we critically chart the alarming rise of this new, anti-
Islamic movement. This approach is complemented by material from original research in the form of 
covert ethnographic fieldwork, which has involved one of the authors gaining access to EDL networks 
and hence attending a number of demonstrations ostensibly as someone who sympathises with its 
ideas. Whilst doing this the researcher took extensive fieldnotes which feed into this article. 
We suggest that the media’s narrow fixation with race reflects a failure of many in the press to 
understand the more complex dynamics at play, and in particular the interplay between Islamophobia, 
ethnicity, race and the politics of identity and nation which are shaping the groups’ ideology (Law, 
2010; Fakete, 2009; Chakraborti, 2007). For that reason we argue that the EDL and Casuals United, 
while sharing some characteristics with establishing far-right parties, mark a different manifestation of 
the fusing of football hooligan casual culture and extremist politics and pose the most significant 
threat to community cohesion in Britain’s inner-cities since the heyday of the National Front in the 
mid-to-late 1970s. 
 
The Birth of the English Defence League 
On 24th May 2009 in Luton a group calling themselves the United People of Luton marched through 
the centre of the town to protest against a small gathering of Muslim extremists (Ahle Sunnah al 
Jamah, a splinter group from the banned Islamic extremist faction Al-Muhajiroun) that had abused 
soldiers from the 2nd Battalion the Royal Anglian Regiment as they paraded through the town on 10 
March 2009 following the regiment’s return from service in Iraq. On that day the collection of around 
15 radical Muslim protesters waved placards with slogans including: ‘Anglian Soldiers: Butchers of 
Basra’, ‘Anglian Soldiers: cowards, killers, extremists’ and ‘British Government Terrorist 
Government’ while shouting abuse at the troops (Gable et al., 2009). While the protest was small 
scale, the presence of television cameras from a regional news programme meant that the protest 
subsequently became a national news feature and the subject of widespread debate.  
Much of that debate concerned the fact that not only had Ahle Sunnah al Jamah had been allowed 
to protest, but it had done so with police protection (Booth, Taylor and Lewis, 2009). This had re-
ignited a debate concerning the rights of extreme Islamic groups to air their views which had first 
emerged followed protests in London outside the Danish embassy in February 2006. On that occasion 
demonstrators including Anjem Choudary (who was involved in organising the subsequent Luton 
anti-soldier protests) campaigned against the publication of twelve editorial cartoons, most of which 
depicted the prophet Muhammed, in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten the previous year. At that 
event, the police had initially failed to take action against a number of protesters who had wielded 
inflammatory banners pronouncing that those who offend Islam should be beheaded, and that 
‘Britain… 7/7 on its way’, which prompted an outcry in the national press (Chakraborti and Garland, 
2009).  
What the Ahle Sunnah al Jamah 2009 protest did achieve was to act as a catalyst for the formation 
of the EDL. Prior to their actions a small but militant group existed in Luton and had previously 
demonstrated its opposition to Ahle Sunnah al Jamah’s activities in the town, but following the March 
2009 incident this collection of individuals decided to become more organised, and formed itself into 
the United People of Luton. As its self-proclaimed leader, Tommy Robinson, states: 
In 2004 we held our own protest when we held a banner up saying ‘Ban the Luton 
Taliban’. … We realised we didn't just want them off the streets of Luton, we wanted 
them off the streets of Britain. When we saw Birmingham’s demonstration [by a group 
called British Citizens Against Muslim Extremists] they were using the same slogans as 
us: ‘We want our country back’, ‘Terrorists off the streets’, ‘Extremists out’, ‘Rule 
Britannia’. From there the EDL was set up (Booth et al., 2009: 14). 
 
On 24 May 2009 the fledgling EDL and Casuals United held an anti-Islamic extremism march in 
Luton with the permission of the police and the local council. The result was that a number of 
marchers broke away from the main body of demonstrators and entered Bury Park, a predominantly 
Muslim area of Luton, where, according to journalist Donal Macintyre (2009), shops and cars were 
subsequently damaged. It seemed ominously like the disturbances might trigger a repeat of the kind of 
riots witnessed in the summer of 2001 in several north-western towns in England. These disorders, 
dubbed the so-called ‘Milltown riots’ as they occurred in towns such as Oldham and Burnley 
traditionally associated with the textiles industry, had involved sustained violence between Asian and 
white youths and the police. They had been precipitated by agitation from far-right groups (Finney 
and Simpson, 2009; Copsey, 2008). Tensions were no doubt heightened by the fact that on 5 May, (as 
the BBC reported) in the run up to the protest, a large Islamic centre and mosque in the same area of 
the city, that had previously been the recipient of racial and religious hate mail, was subject to an 
arson attack (BBC, 2009a). Surprisingly, though, reporting of these events was largely limited to anti-
fascist publications and websites such as Searchlight (see Woodson (2009) for example).  
However, while the first demonstrations by the group were small-scale, attended by just dozens of 
supporters vocal in their opposition to Sharia law and ‘radical Islam’, during the latter months of 2009 
the numbers attending EDL marches grew dramatically. Indeed, in a short space of time in Autumn 
2009, the EDL developed into a significant street protest movement capable of mobilising over 1,000 
protesters in different demonstrations in Birmingham (where there have been three separate marches), 
Nottingham, Manchester and Leeds. All of these received substantial press coverage after violent 
clashes between the EDL and anti-fascist protesters (for the most part from the organisation Unite 
Against Fascism (UAF)) and the police in Birmingham in September, resulted in a significant number 
of arrests (Tweedie, 2009). In January 2010 the EDL boasted on its Twitter website that it had 8,013 
followers on its official forum, and 12,038 people affiliated to its Facebook page (English Defence 
League, 2010), and in the space of a year its numbers attending protests have grown exponentially. 
 
Violence, the EDL, Casuals United and Football Hooliganism 
Evidence gathered from ethnographic fieldwork, reports in the anti-fascist magazine Searchlight as 
well as analysis of social networking sites such as Facebook, seems to suggest strong links between 
the EDL and football hooligan supporter groups. Coalescing under the banner of ‘Casuals United’, 
these groups share much of the EDL’s anti-Islamic thinking, as their website shows: 
We are an alliance of British Football Casuals of various different colours/races who 
have come together in order to create a massive, but peaceful protest group to force our 
Government to get their act in gear….Casuals United now has over 50 active branches, 
each doing their own thing, but ready to unite when needed. Violent extremists are on 
our streets, preaching hatred of the west, trying to incite young people to blow 
themselves up and commit acts of terror against us, and our Government and police are 
either turning a blind eye, and/or actively helping them in their aims. They wish to 
impose Sharia law upon us by stealth, and are already operating 85 of these courts in 
Britain behind closed doors (Casuals United, 2009a). 
 
In such statements some of the contradictory nature of Casuals United’s claims is revealed. For one, 
the group may position itself as being at odds with violent behaviour, yet paradoxically, the group 
made little if any attempt to hide its ‘football casual’ (or football ‘hooligan’) connection. Indeed, for 
the most part the supporters of Casuals United follow what might broadly be termed the ‘casual style’ 
long associated with violent football firms (see Treadwell, 2008), showing a particular penchant for 
expensive, exclusive designer clothing. In particular they tend to have an affinity for labels such as 
Stone Island, CP Company and Aquascutum, which are much in evidence at Casuals United and EDL 
gatherings. Moreover, the ‘leader’ of Casuals United makes no attempt to hide the background of 
many of those involved, stating that Casuals United is: 
…a mixed-race group of English people, from businessmen and women, to football 
hooligans. I came up with the idea to unite football fans to forget their petty rivalries 
and come together in a national movement. There are a lot of people in their forties and 
fifties who used to be football hooligans but went on to settle down (Jenkins, 2009: 17). 
 
The mobilisation of many football hooligan ‘firms’, witnessed during the covert ethnographic 
fieldwork by one of the authors, seems to suggest that the link between Casuals United and the EDL is 
a strong one and in many instances individuals have an affinity to both. Indeed, the range of hooligan 
groups spotted on EDL demonstrations and the wide geographical range from which they originate, 
suggests that, in many ways, the EDL and Casuals United are one and the same organisation.  
For example, it is clear that an early and central concern of both Casuals United and the EDL has 
been what they regard as the ‘imposition’ of Sharia law in England. On 4 July 2009, the EDL picketed 
a ‘Life under the Shari’ah’ Islamic road show in Wood Green, North London, organised by the 
aforementioned Islamist extremist Anjem Choudary. On the same day the EDL and Casuals United 
(particularly members of its Birmingham branch) staged a voluble protest in Birmingham’s Bullring 
‘against Muslim extremists that interrupted a British soldier’s funeral’ (notes from fieldwork, 4 July). 
While both events attracted little attention because they passed off relatively peacefully, a second 
protest in Birmingham, announced because of the failure of the 4 July protest to attract significant 
publicity, was to be the start of a much more disorderly phase for the EDL.  
The date for this demonstration ‘against Sharia law’, organised by the EDL and Casuals United, 
was set for 8 August. Interest in attending the demonstration grew on internet forums the authors 
monitored before the march, with some discussion noting that the event fell on the eighth day of the 
eighth month (which, with ‘H’ as the eighth letter of the alphabet, translates for Nazis as ‘HH’ or 
‘Heil Hitler’). Indeed, while claims made by organisers were that the march was not racist, the protest 
had been heavily promoted on the fascist and white supremacist website ‘Stormfront’ (Hundal, 2009). 
The march was preceded by an announcement that Unite Against Fascism, supported by the 
Respect Party, would hold a counter protest in Birmingham on the same day. There had been a 
growing climate of hostility between the UAF and EDL broadcast on internet forums and a large 
police presence was deployed (Kerbaj, 2009). While the counter-protest took place in the open space 
next to Birmingham’s Bullring shopping centre at the bottom of the city’s New Street area, members 
of the EDL and Casuals United gathered in several locations, at the opposite end of New Street in 
Victoria Square, where they unveiled anti-Islamic banners (Kerbaj, 2009). 
While UAF had been in discussion with West Midlands Police and had fully co-operated with 
them throughout the planning stages of this event, the EDL and Casuals United had refused to 
negotiate or enter into any discourse with the police (although the police were aware of their intention 
to march that day (BBC, 2009a)). Perhaps inevitably, disorder later began when a rather drunken man 
with the EDL supporters at the lower end of New Street threw a can of lager over the top of a police 
cordon into the UAF protesters before brandishing a Union Jack flag (field notes, 8 August). At that 
point violence flared and there were reports that a number of assaults were committed by Asian men 
against young, white males in the vicinity, some of whom were clearly not part of the protest groups 
and had no links to the EDL whatsoever, but were assaulted because of their ethnicity and their close 
proximity to the protests (Booth and Jones, 2009). They were simply the wrong people in the wrong 
place at the wrong time.  
In the few days following the disorder internet forums capitalised on the fact that the police 
appeals to the public to name those involved, which included the release of CCTV images of suspects, 
revealed that many of those they were seeking were young Asian males, and also that many of those 
who were assaulted in the city centre were white. This allowed the EDL to circulate the story that the 
police had appeased ‘radical Islamists’ and that white people had been the victims of Muslim 
violence. The climate of the Birmingham protests had indeed been extremely charged, and field 
experience would suggest that the majority of violence did originate from UAF factions, even if there 
was some extreme provocation from EDL supporters. 
Whatever the case, the July 2009 disorders in Birmingham appeared to act as a catalyst for the 
growth in the EDL and an expansion of its activities. Further demonstrations were staged towards the 
end of 2009, all of them, to one degree or another, descending into violence. At the following protest 
in Birmingham in September, 90 arrests were made as EDL supporters clashed with the police, the 
UAF and local Asian youths in a series of running battles in and around the city centre. More disorder 
occurred at a demonstration opposing the construction of a mosque in Harrow, north London, a few 
days later, and there were 30 arrests at a large EDL march in Manchester a month afterwards, while in 
Nottingham in early December even a security operation costing over £1m could not prevent 
substantial disorder surrounding an EDL protest attended by over 500 marchers chanting ‘We want 
our country back’, ‘No surrender to the Taliban’ and ‘Protect women, no to Sharia’ (Townsend, 
2009). 
What these events appeared to reveal was the growing confidence within the EDL as its supporter 
base expanded. By the turn of the year it was being viewed as a serious threat to the community 
cohesion of many urban areas as its mixture of English patriotism, aggression and Islamophobia 
seemed to be welcomed by its target audience of disaffected and disenchanted white working class 
males involved with, or at the fringes of, the football hooligan scene (Lowles, 2009b). It appeared as 
though the EDL had been very successful in mobilising such hooligan groups who had historically 
been a target of far-right groups. To place this success in context, this article will now outline the 
historical relationship between the far-right and football hooliganism and will show how the EDL and 
Casuals United’s activities form a new chapter in this troubled history. 
 
Football and the Far-right: A Brief Historical Overview 
The historical ties between far-right groups and football fans, and in particular football hooligan 
firms, have often been overstated by the media and especially by the tabloid press that has been prone 
to simplistically linking football disorder with the activities of racist skinhead gangs (Back, Crabbe 
and Solomos, 2001). This is not to say, though, that some far-right organisations, notably the White 
Defence League in the 1950s, the National Front (NF) in the 1970s and the BNP in the 1990s, have 
not seen football supporters as potentially fertile ground for recruitment. Overall, though, and unlike 
the situation involving the EDL and Casuals United, these attempts have met, with one or two high-
profile exceptions at clubs such as Chelsea, with little apparent success among fans of domestic club 
football (Lowles, 2009b; Frosdick and Marsh, 2005). 
At national level there is some evidence of a different story, with England fans being involved in 
a number of violent incidents abroad that have been wholly or partially blamed on the malign 
influence of neo-fascist groups such as the NF, BNP and Combat 18. From the early 1980s, for 
example, when sections of the media commented that ‘the NF seemed to be everywhere’ at a 
Denmark versus England match in Copenhagen in 1982, through to disorder involving England fans 
at major tournaments such as Italia ’90, Euro ’96 and France ’98, the far-right has been implicated, at 
least to a degree, in the disturbances (Garland and Rowe, 2001). 
During this period one issue around which Combat 18 has sought to mobilise football supporters 
and football hooligans is Ulster loyalism and hostility to Irish nationalism, vividly illustrated by 
clashes between England supporters and Irish fans which led to the curtailment of the Ireland versus 
England friendly match in Dublin in February 1995. Many media reports focused on the role that the 
BNP and Combat 18 had played in orchestrating the disturbances as a vehicle to air their opposition to 
Anglo-Irish efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement in Northern Ireland (Garland and Rowe, 2001). 
One factor which was widely cited as evidence of extreme right involvement in the disorders was the 
chanting of ‘No surrender to the IRA’, a common refrain of groups such as the BNP echoed in the 
‘No surrender to the Taliban’ chants heard on EDL marches in 2009. 
However, the centrality of C18 in organising the events at Lansdowne Road is often exaggerated, 
not least by C18 themselves, and it may well be the case that the English support that night was made 
up of a number of fans violently hostile to the Anglo-Irish agreement, and that C18 constituted just a 
small part of this crowd. Arguably, though, C18’s links to domestic football hooliganism are more 
significant than its influence among England fans, as it has been alleged that C18 played a pivotal role 
in the outbreak of the racialised disorders in Oldham in May 2001, mentioned above. During the 
earlier part of that year the north-west town had been experiencing heightened tension between its 
local Asian and white communities. In an attempt to inflame this situation, Combat 18 attracted 
sympathisers from its national hooligan network to Oldham for the last match of the 2000/01 football 
season, including hundreds of Stoke City supporters, ostensibly to engage in disorder in Westwood, a 
part of the town with a large Asian presence (Lowles, 2009b). Three weeks later (and in an eerie 
precursor to the way that hooligan groups have more recently come together under the Casuals United 
banner), an alliance of Oldham Athletic, Stockport County, Shrewsbury Town and Huddersfield 
Town hooligans congregated in Oldham and engaged in violent confrontation with local Asians, 
precipitating widespread rioting. As Lowles (2001: xiv) argues, whatever the underlying social causes 
were for the disturbances, they had undoubtedly been triggered ‘by the actions of C18 thugs and their 
football hooligan allies who … had finally got what [they] wanted. Race war’. 
Organisations such as the anti-fascist campaigning group Searchlight fear that one of the aims of 
the EDL’s provocative demonstrations is to trigger something similar in the towns and cities it is 
targeting through an alliance of football hooligan crews, via Casuals United, that are sympathetic to 
its cause (Booth et al., 2009). There certainly appears to be evidence that when the EDL does protest, 
it can do so by mobilising football hooligan crews with the objective of creating animosity between its 
supporters and young Asian (and especially Muslim) males. This often done in a manner that 
provokes the latter into retaliatory violence that unfortunately makes them seem as though they are 
not only the instigators of the disorder but that this disorder is racially motivated on their part. This 
was vividly illustrated by the events recounted, to one of the co-authors, by the landlady of a 
Birmingham bar (used by some EDL members before joining the protests), interviewed in the wake of 
the July violence: 
Co-author: ‘So what happened earlier on here then? 
Licensee: ‘Well this lad, he had just been for a quite drink, had about two pints on his 
own. As he left he was set upon by about ten Asian lads, they just kicked the hell out of 
him for no reason at all, he was just having a drink then going to meet his girlfriend - 
and he ends up going off in an ambulance. I didn’t have any door staff on and so no-
one helped him, he just got battered for no reason, well except for being white’ 
Co-author: So he wasn’t EDL 
Licensee: No, we had a few in here earlier on, but he was just a normal kid having a 
beer at the weekend [Research field notes – Birmingham protest 5/9/09] 
 
 
Much of the Birmingham disorder was instigated by the Casuals United element among the 
demonstrators, showing how successful elements of the far-right have been in mobilising disaffected 
football hooligans to its cause. As Lowles (2009a: 6) reports, the businessman bankrolling the EDL 
sees football fans as ‘a potential source of support. They are a hoi polloi that gets off their backsides 
and travels to a city and they are available before and after matches’. The views of an EDL 
spokesperson would appear to concur, seeing football supporters as ‘patriotic and they will stand their 
ground if it comes to it’ (ibid: 6). It is this mixture of patriotism and fighting ability – ‘standing their 
ground’ if there is disorder – that is apparently so prized by the EDL. Its close relationship with 
Casuals United means that it already has a supply of ‘footsoldiers’ that it can draw upon from clubs as 
disparate as Luton Town, Aston Villa, Queens Park Rangers, Southampton, Bristol Rovers, West 
Bromwich Albion, Lincoln City and Wolverhampton Wanderers (Lowles, 2009a), raising the distinct 
possibility that the events of 2001, that led to the outbreak of the Milltown disorders, could be 
repeated. 
 
The Politics and Motivations of the EDL – Moving Beyond the Far Right Label? 
One of the distinctive and peculiar aspects of the EDL’s politics is the group’s emphasis upon anti-
racism and its vocal opposition to the British National Party and Combat 18. Apparently in an effort 
both to distance itself from the BNP and other far-right groupings, and in an attempt to create a united 
‘front’ with those from minority ethnic groupings that may oppose aspects of Islam, the EDL has 
displayed ‘Black and White Unite’ banners at many of its demonstrations and repeatedly stressed its 
opposition to racism, fascism and Nazism. The rather theatrical burning of a swastika flag at an EDL 
press conference in October 2009 was, in the eyes of those sympathisers present, proof of their anti-
Nazi credentials (BBC, 2009b). The presence of several black and Asian EDL supporters at a 
demonstration in Leicester in 2010 was further evidence of this (fieldnotes, 9 October 2010), and at 
this rally, the EDL’s leader stressed this point when he addressed the crowd: 
We’re not Nazis, we’re not fascists – we will smash Nazis the same way we will smash 
militant Islam. We are exactly about black and white unite, every single community in 
this country can come and join our ranks, fill our ranks. We don’t care if you arrived here 
yesterday; you’re welcome to protect our Christian culture and our way of life. 
(Speech by Tommy Robinson, recorded by researcher, 9 October 2010).  
 
It would seem much of the EDL’s energy is devoted to accusing the media of lazy journalism and 
point-scoring by highlighting how as a group they contradict the typical and traditional racism of the 
far right. The anti-fascist organisation Searchlight, however, would contend this claim, and has 
repeatedly highlighted the links between the EDL and the BNP including a number of individuals, 
influential in the former, that are also members of, or have been involved with, the latter, including 
the EDL’s leader himself (Woodson, 2009). The EDL has also championed women’s and gay rights in 
an attempt to prove its democratic, non-extremist credentials while at the same time trying to show 
that Islam is a religion opposed to homosexuality and women’s equality. Some of its supporters also 
apparently have a pro-Israeli stance, evidenced by the appearance of Star of David flags at some of 
their marches (witnessed by the authors at a number of demonstrations during fieldwork in 2009 and 
2010). These viewpoints are at odds with many of those normally associated with far-right parties that 
have long championed the ‘traditional’ ideas of the family and of the role of women within it, whilst 
being vocal in their opposition to homosexuality. Anti-semitism has, of course, been a feature of 
many of these extremist groupings since the 1930s (Copsey, 2008). 
However, whether these ‘tolerant’ facets of the EDL’s thinking can be taken at face value is a 
moot point. It could well be the case that many of these more moderate aspects of their ideological 
framework are simply adopted in order to be seen to be in opposition to the tenets of what they 
believe constitute ‘extremist Islam’. This may well explain the adoption of Star of David flags, which 
may in reality be deployed by EDL marchers in order to provoke a reaction from Muslim observers 
who object to Israeli policies in the Middle East. Similarly, the championing of the rights of women 
and gay and lesbian people may merely be an attempt to persuade the public (and media) that the EDL 
is, in fact, a moderate movement in the face of an intolerant religion (Islam) that grants little freedom 
to women or those of minority sexualities. The EDL may well be hoping that by embracing ‘liberal’ 
causes the media will cast them in a moderate light and, in turn, Islam in a bad, extremist one.  
However, the true nature of the EDL‘s politics may have inadvertently been given away by 
Tommy Robinson in his speech at the Leicester demonstration in October 2010, cited above. His 
reference to ‘our Christian culture’ reveal that his view of English society and Englishness is narrow 
and exclusive of those of different cultures and religious backgrounds, or of those who do not 
conform to his vision of what constitutes ‘our way of life’. In the same speech, he went on to say: ‘We 
will combat militant Islam wherever it raises its ugly, paedophilic, disturbed, medieval fucking head’, 
in a passage of speech that comes close to inciting religious hatred, as defined by the Racial and 
Religious Hatred Act, 2006. Certainly, if the leader of the EDL is stressing conformity to ‘our culture’ 
on the one hand, and condemning aspects of Islam in such brutal terms on the other, then he is 
undermining the organisation’s own claims to moderation and tolerance of difference. 
Moreover, the insignia and apparel adopted by the EDL and Casuals United may inadvertently 
give away important aspects of their ideologies. The EDL has been marketing a range of apparel (that 
displays its name and other insignia) through its website and the auction site eBay. These items 
heavily rely upon the Flag of Saint George. Clearly, for many in the EDL and Casuals United, 
football, the St George’s flag, and ideas of national identity and belonging, are inextricably 
interwoven, and the wide scale adoption of the St George’s flag by these groups is perhaps in itself 
telling. Recent debates about the appropriateness of flying the St George’s flag (such as those which 
inevitably occurred during the World Cup in Germany in 2006) have attempted to reposition the flag 
as a symbol of multi-ethnic Britain, whereas, previously and in contrast to this, the Union Jack was 
castigated for its association with colonialism and white racism (Gilroy, 2004). The obvious irony of 
course is that the St George’s flag’s older historical association with the Crusades, an earlier conflict 
between Christian Europe and Islam, means its adoption by the EDL is loaded with symbolism and 
meaning. In many ways, the very adoption of this flag as a symbol encompasses much of the message 
of these groups. It seems ‘British Muslim’ or ‘English Muslim’ are clearly regarded as unacceptable 
identities by many of the EDL’s supporters, an assertion that is given further evidence by the types of 
discussions with white male EDL members witnessed by one of the authors when conducting covert 
ethnographic on EDL demonstrations: 
See that [points at St. George’s flag flying above a church] that makes me proud, it’s what 
being English is all about, but where I come from that isn't seen anymore. The Pakis have 
taken over the churches and turned them into mosques, now what the fuck is that about, 
eh? [sings] Give me bullets for my gun and I will shoot the Muzzie scum, No surrender to 
the Taliban. 
 
I am sick of the lot of them [Muslims] and their demands, all take, take, take. They take the 
piss out of us, bringing in hundreds of them over through arranged marriages and that, 
looking after one another and fucking us over. It has to stop; this is England, not 
Afghanistan! 
 
They can’t live like us cos they are not evolved for it, they are simple, made for backward 
villages in the mountain where they can sit around eating stinking curries and raping 
chickens. They come over here and ruin England, I mean, would you want to live next to 
them? I don’t, but they are taking over. That is why I want them gone.   
 
Although the EDL’s organisers are at pains to distance themselves and the EDL from racist 
sentiments such as these, fieldwork suggests that this kind of racism and Islamophobia may well be 
more commonplace among the EDL’s ‘rank and file’ than the group’s leaders would publically admit. 
However, the EDL presents a more moderate, and much less overtly Islamophobic, public face by 
playing upon the present ‘risky’ status assigned to British (particularly Muslim) Asians in the popular 
press over the course of the last decade. As Mythen and colleagues have noted, Islam has variously 
been portrayed in the mainstream press as: 
… connected to the problems of violent crime, ‘honour killings’, drugs, illegal 
immigration and fraudulent welfare claims. This perceived ‘riskiness’ operates 
mundanely as a threat to the ‘ fabric ’ of predominantly white British culture through 
transgression of school dress codes or refusal to neglect traditional forms of worship, 
and profanely through religious extremism and radicalization. In media and political 
circles … dominant discourses have invariably defined British Muslims en bloc as a 
risky, suspect population, raising the intensity of scrutiny on Muslims in general and 
potentially exacerbating the degree of public suspicion directed towards young male 
Muslims (Mythen, Walklate and Khan, 2009: 5). 
 
In the eyes of many therefore, Islam has become anti-British, anti-modern, anti-liberal and dangerous 
(Williamson and Khiabany, 2010; Fakete, 2009). The twin elements identified by Law (2010) that are 
often conflated within the umbrella term ‘Islamophobia’ – anti-Islam sentiment and hostility directed 
at Muslims – have been adeptly exploited by the EDL. In particular, the organisation has been clever 
in the way that it has tapped into the frustrations of a disenfranchised section of the white working 
class whose grievances arise from a dense tapestry of social, economic and cultural conditions (and 
neglects), the consequences of which are still being played out – post 9/11 and 7/7 – as part of a 
global, national and local narrative with, as Mythen et al. mention above, an increasingly explicit tone 
of cultural, religious and racial hostility. There is also a sense within these communities that the main 
political parties have prioritised service provision towards minority ethnic residents, migrants and 
asylum seekers. This strong sense of injustice amongst some white communities, who feel that their 
own needs had been unfairly overlooked in favour of ‘undeserving’ minority ethnic, and especially 
Muslim, populations, and in such a climate the EDL’s vocal opposition to ‘extreme Islam’ has been 
fused together with a determination to stand up for ‘English culture’. Yet such sentiments are 
commonly encountered in the Daily Mail, Sun and Daily Star is not far removed from those shared by 
many in the groups (the EDL included) that the press roundly condemn and label ‘far-right’.  
Without wishing to simplify explanations for racial or religious hostility (see Gadd, 2009, for a 
neat summary of relevant debates), much of the EDL’s support appears to stem from communities 
that are situated where a large Asian and Islamic population is found (for example, the likes of 
Birmingham and Luton). It is often in these areas where poor, socially excluded white communities 
live in close proximity to large Asian populations where there can often be very little interaction 
between these groups, and where mutual suspicion and hostility can develop (McGhee, 2008). It is 
within such areas, where the tensions are stoked by agitation and aggression from the EDL, that the 
‘prospect of violence and communities tearing themselves apart is very real’ (Lowles, 2009b: 7), yet it 
is also within these groups that the red top media tends to find its readership. Analysis of posts on 
EDL websites reveals that the opinions stated often chime with sentiments expressed on online 
comment pages linked to newspapers concerning stories about ‘Islamic terrorism’ or fundamentalist 
Islam. 
 
Conclusion: How Dangerous is the EDL? 
This article has traced the rapid growth of a new ‘street army’ political phenomenon, the English 
Defence League, from its roots amongst a handful of people in Luton in the spring of 2009 to its 
current status as a grouping that can attract over a thousand people to its marches. The importance of 
an affiliated (and indeed overlapping) group, Casuals United, has also been acknowledged, 
particularly in relation to the capability of the EDL to mobilise large numbers of ‘street fighters’ to its 
demonstrations. The similarities to the way that, historically, the far-right has tried to attract football 
fans, and in particular hooligans, to its cause, was also noted in the way that the relationship between 
the EDL and Casuals United has developed. 
The nature of the EDL’s politics has also been discussed, and it has been suggested that much of 
this is flavoured by overt hostility towards Muslim communities that is partly borne out of a sense that 
such communities are unfairly being allocated resources at the expense of poor, white, working class 
populations. Indeed, the logic that underpins the EDL and Casual United’s agenda is that the British 
government has engaged in the promotion and elevation of the interests of Islam against the white, 
Judeo-Christian traditions of liberty and equity they regard as ‘English’, including the differential 
treatment that, in their eyes, most (if not all) Muslims have been demanding (the recognition of Sharia 
being the most obvious). It is in the state’s perceived appeasement of Muslim interest groups that their 
logic is formed, even if, in reality, the state’s response to Muslim groups post-9/11 and 7/7 has in 
reality been marked by anything but appeasement (Chakraborti and Garland, 2009). For example, the 
increased use of stop and search against young Asian men has produced tensions between them and 
the police in many cities with large Muslim populations (such as Birmingham, London and 
Manchester, see Liberty (2005)). 
A fascinating aspect of the EDL’s politics is its supposed opposition to the BNP, Combat 18 and 
other far-right extremist groups, even though it appears to share some of their ideas, members, street 
tactics and insignia. It claims not to be racist and to oppose only radical Islam, but this veneer of 
respectability is rather thin. Indeed, the researchers can attest to the fact that songs favoured by the 
EDL and Casuals United are frequently overtly hostile to Islam in general and all Muslims. In a 
Birmingham bar both during and after the EDL’s protests on 5 September 2009, and in Leicester pubs 
and on the streets on 9 October 2010, for example, the authors heard EDL members singing ‘You can 
shove your fucking Allah up your arse’, ‘Ten Muslim bombers’, as well as the afore-mentioned ‘No 
surrender to the Taliban’ and ‘Give me a gun and I will shoot the Muzzie scum’.  
Interestingly, this is not the only way that the EDL seek to challenge some of the legitimacy of 
comparing them to traditional, neo-Nazi organisations. Clearly the organisation does have (albeit very 
limited) support from black, Asian and mixed-race members. Also the anti-Semitism previously 
associated with extremist groups is not evident, as the EDL have positioned themselves as pro-Israeli, 
pro-women’s equality and also supportive of gay rights, although whether such enlightened attitudes 
exist among the organisation’s rank and file is a moot point. 
Nevertheless, Sibbitt’s (1997) research into the influence of far-right groupings among urban, 
white working class communities suggests that while parties like the BNP may garner little electoral 
support from the residents of the housing estates she studied, what they did achieve was to channel the 
sense of grievance and anger that some white people felt about their own poor living standards 
towards local minority ethnic people:  
In general, the young people were not members of these organisations. However, they 
were aware that the far-right presence and propaganda were threatening towards ethnic 
minorities. The young people therefore co-opted the language and insignia of these 
organisations into their own activities, such as graffiti or writing and posting 
threatening notes (Sibbitt, 1997: 38) 
 
It seems as though this may be reflected in much of the EDL’s popularity, as it offers the chance for 
disenfranchised communities to latch onto a cause that seems to embody a sense of national identity 
and belonging while simultaneously presenting a scapegoat for much of those communities’ ills. It 
also has insignia that can be worn and chants that can be adopted and used in a threatening way 
towards those scapegoats – urban Muslim populations. If the EDL continues to grow at its present 
rate, and continues to provoke and to agitate, then it may well be that the racialised disturbances 
witnessed in 2001 will be repeated in the not too distant future. 
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ii  Domestic banning orders arose in their current form from the Football (Disorder) Act 2000 and are court 
orders which prohibit fans from attending matches for a specified period of time. 
